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Diamond Star Global Sdn Bhd v Joint Controller of Patents and Designs (2023)

High Court of Delhi·C. Hari Shankar J·Single Judge·Decided 29 March 2023·2023:DHC:2316; 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1879

Doubted Appeal allowed; the refusal set aside and the invention held entitled to grant. The Madras High Court declined to follow its reading of 'mere' in Section 3(c) in Genmab v Assistant Controller and Immunas Pharma v Assistant Controller (both 6 March 2024); the Delhi High Court relied on it in Pioneer Hi-Bred v Controller (22 July 2026). No further appeal traced as of 17 October 2026.

'Mere' in Section 3(c) governs both limbs; a skin-care process using guaiacol-free mangrove wood vinegar at 18–22% was inventive and sufficiently disclosed: refusal set aside, patent to proceed.

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Diamond Star Global Sdn Bhd v Joint Controller of Patents and Designs, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/diamond-star

Judgment PDF

Summary

“The skin care formulation that the appellant seeks to patent, which it calls” a “Hygiene Wash”, “contains wood vinegar obtained from the Rhizophora apiculata tree, in a concentration of 18 to 22%.” (para 2) “The Controller of Patents” “has, by order dated 2nd June 2022, rejected the appellant’s application for grant of a patent” (para 3), refusing it “on account of insufficient disclosure” of “the claimed process in the specification” (para 17). Counsel for the Controller relied on “Section 2(1)(ja) as well as 3(c)” of the Patents Act (para 24).

The Court held that “It is only mere discovery of a living thing, or non-living substance occurring in nature which, therefore, according to me, would fall within the second part of Section 3(c)” (para 34.1), and that “the Controller has erred is in failing to observe that the appellant was not seeking to merely patent wood vinegar obtained from the Rhizophora apiculata tree” (para 35). It found that the cited documents did not teach the two properties that “constitute USP of the invention” (para 41), and that “it cannot, in my considered view, be held that the appellant’s application was lacking even in respect of sufficiency of disclosure” (para 38). “Consequently, the impugned order dated 2nd June 2022, passed by the Controller, is quashed and set aside.” (para 44) “The present appeal stands allowed accordingly.” (para 47)

What the court decided

  1. Obiter. The two sides of a patent. “On the one hand, the very raison d’ etre of patent is fostering of scientific temper, and protection of the inventive faculties of persons who, expending their scientific and technical knowledge, inventing new products and processes, thereby incrementing the state of existing scientific knowledge. On the other, the grant of a patent results in a monopoly, in the patent holder, of the right to use the invention during the life of the patent, thereby excluding its availability to all others who may desire to create something similar.” “Effecting of minute or non-incremental changes in a patented invention, with a view to claim a new invention and a new patent, therefore, constitutes evergreening of the patent, which is completely proscribed in law.” (para 29)
  2. The word mere in Section 3(c). “The provision has, in my considered opinion, to be interpreted as it stands.” The word “mere” “as used in the opening part of the said Clause would apply, in my opinion, both to the first part” and “to the second part”. “It is only mere discovery of a living thing, or non-living substance occurring in nature which, therefore, according to me, would fall within the second part of Section 3(c).” (para 34.1)
  3. The guaiacol illustration. “If someone were to seek a patent for guaiacol, it would be possible to reject the application on the ground that guaiacol is a substance occurring in nature and, therefore, even if it had not been earlier discovered, the mere discovery of guaiacol was not patentable as an invention, in view of the proscription contained in Section 3(c).” “Where, however, the Controller has erred is in failing to observe that the appellant was not seeking to merely patent wood vinegar obtained from the Rhizophora apiculata tree.” (para 35)
  4. New product or process after Novartis. Recording the law declared in Novartis v Union of India (2013), the Court held: “The Supreme Court, therefore, advocates according, to the expression” “in Section 2(1)(j), an expansive, rather than a restrictive, interpretation, and Article 141 of the Constitution of India makes that interpretation binding on every authority lower in the judicial hierarchy, including this Court.” (paras 31, 36)
  5. Source, process and strength. “I do not see how the claims of the appellant, of which it sought a patent, which identified the Rhizophora apiculata tree as the appropriate source of the wood vinegar to be used, the process to which the wood vinegar would have to be subject, and the appropriate strength in which the wood vinegar, so processed, would have to be added, with other additives, while preparing the skin care formulation, can be regarded as lacking in any inventive step. The claims of the appellant are interdependent, not independent, and have to be seen as such.” (para 36)
  6. No comparison with other wood vinegars. “I do not find, in the application submitted by the appellant, any categorical admission that there were other earlier preparations of wood vinegars, which were added to skin care preparations, so as to confer antimicrobial properties.” (para 37) “Even if, arguendo, the submissions, were to be accepted, that, in my considered opinion, cannot really constitute a legitimate basis to reject the appellant’s application as wanting in any inventive step.” (paras 37–38)
  7. Sufficiency of disclosure. “The complete specifications filed by the appellant before the Controller contained detailed workings of how, when the appellant’s product was added, these properties were found to result. As such, it cannot, in my considered view, be held that the appellant’s application was lacking even in respect of sufficiency of disclosure.” (para 38) “The disclosures in the application submitted by the appellant were, ex facie, sufficient to support the claims, the scope of which the impugned order misconstrues.” (paras 38, 42)
  8. What the prior art taught. “None of the cited prior art documents D-1 to D-3 either identified Rhizophora apiculata as the appropriate plant or tree, the wood vinegar of which was free from guaiacol or identified the said wood vinegar as, being most appropriate as an additive to skin care preparations at a concentration of 18 to 22%, to distinguish between the beneficial and harmful bacteria.” “These two properties, which, in a manner of speaking, constitute USP of the invention which the appellant sought to patent, are not taught by any of the prior art documents D-1 to D-3.” (para 41)
  9. The inventive step the order missed. “The impugned order of the Controller does not contradict any of the grounds on which the appellant had, in its response to the FER” (“First Examination Report”), “contested D-1 to D-3 as being appropriate prior art. Further, the impugned order of the Controller fails to recognise the inherent inventive step involved in (i) identifying the wood vinegar obtained from the Rhizophora apiculata as being free of guaiacol and, therefore, suitable for addition of skin care cosmetics, (ii) working out the composition of 18 to 22% as the appropriate strength” (para 42)
  10. Disposition. “Consequently, the impugned order dated 2nd June 2022, passed by the Controller, is quashed and set aside.” (para 44) “Inasmuch as this judgment covers the objections contained both in the FER as well as in the impugned order, and there is no other objection to the patenting of the appellant’s invention, the invention is held entitled to grant of a patent.” (para 45) “The Controller is, therefore, directed to proceed in accordance with law towards grant of patent in respect of the appellant’s application.” (paras 44–46)

Subsequent treatment

No further appeal traced as of 17 October 2026.

Provisions and topics

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Cases this judgment relies on

Case page

Novartis AG v Union of India (2013)

Supreme Court of India

Cited in

Case page · Page updated 17 October 2026

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