Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v Competition Commission of India (2016)
High Court of Delhi·Vibhu Bakhru J·Single Judge·Decided 30 March 2016
The Patents Act does not oust the Competition Commission's jurisdiction over abuse of dominance by a patentee holding standard essential patents; Ericsson's writ petitions dismissed.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v Competition Commission of India, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/ericsson-cci
Summary
“These petitions have been filed by Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ), a company incorporated under the Laws of Sweden” ... “impugning orders dated 12th November, 2013 and 16th January, 2014” ... “passed by the Competition Commission of India” ... “under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002” (para 1). “Both Micromax and Intex have alleged that Ericsson, which has a large portfolio of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in respect of technologies that are used in mobile handsets and network stations, has abused its position of dominance.” (para 3) “According to Ericsson, the impugned orders passed by the CCI” (“Competition Commission of India”) “are without jurisdiction as it lacks the jurisdiction to commence any proceeding in relation to a claim of royalty by a proprietor of a patent” (para 4).
The Court held that “the Patents Act would be a Special Act, vis-à-vis, the Competition Act in so far as patents are concerned” (para 144), but that “there is no irreconcilable repugnancy or conflict between the Competition Act and the Patents Act. And, in absence of any irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the jurisdiction of CCI to entertain complaints for abuse of dominance in respect of Patent rights cannot be ousted.” (para 174) It held that “seeking injunctive reliefs by an SEP” (“Standard Essential Patent”) “holder in certain circumstances may amount to abuse of its dominant position” (para 199), and that it was “unable to accept that the impugned orders passed by CCI are perverse and, therefore, without jurisdiction” (para 208). “In view of the aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed. All applications also stand disposed of. All interim orders are vacated.” (para 212)
What the court decided
- Procedure. Reviewing a direction to investigate. “the decision in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) cannot be read as an authority for the proposition that a direction passed under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act is outside the scope of judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (para 58) “In the given facts, I am unable to accept that Ericsson’s challenge to the impugned orders should be rejected at this stage solely on the ground that it does not affect Ericsson’s right” (para 66). “The question, whether in the given facts the CCI” (“Competition Commission of India”) “has the jurisdiction to pass directions under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act for causing an investigation and whether such directions are in terms of the statute would clearly fall within the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (para 77) “the fact that Ericsson had an alternative remedy, albeit at a later stage, would not in any manner disable this court from entertaining the present petition.” (paras 58, 66, 77, 82)
- Procedure. The limits of that review. “the scope of judicial review of the directions issued under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act is limited and does not extend to examining the merits of the allegations.” (para 74) “a challenge to the jurisdiction of the CCI to pass such directions under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act must be examined on a demurrer; that is, the information received under Section 19 must be considered as correct” (paras 74, 79)
- A patentee as an enterprise. “All kinds of property (other than actionable claims, money and immovable property) would fall within the definition of ‘goods’ and this would also include intangible and incorporeal property such as patents.” (para 103) “Mr Vaidyanathan’s contention that patents are not goods cannot be accepted. Consequently, Ericsson would fall within the definition of ’enterprise’ under Section 2(h) of the Competition Act.” (paras 103–104)
- A special Act for patents. “Undoubtedly, the Competition Act and Patents Act are special acts operating in their respective fields, however, viewed in the aforesaid perspective the Patents Act would be a Special Act, vis-à-vis, the Competition Act in so far as patents are concerned. The Patents Act is a self contained code.” (para 144) “Thus, if there are irreconcilable differences between the Patents Act and the Competition Act in so far as anti-abuse provisions are concerned, the Patents Act being a special act shall prevail notwithstanding the provision of Section 60 of the Competition Act.” (paras 144, 151)
- Sections 60 and 62. “Section 60 is enacted only to restate and emphasize that notwithstanding agreements, arrangements, practices and conduct which may otherwise be legitimate under the general laws would nonetheless be subject to the rigors of the Competition Act. Section 60 cannot be read to curtail or whittle down the provisions of other statutes; this interpretation would also be in sync with provisions of Section 62 of the Competition Act as indicated above.” (para 149)
- Two sets of remedies. “the remedies as provided under Section 27 of the Competition Act for abuse of dominant position are materially different from the remedy as available under Section 84 of the Patents Act. It is also apparent that the remedies under the two enactments are not mutually exclusive; in other words grant of one is not destructive of the other.” (para 162) “whereas Section 84 of the Patents Act provides specific remedy to the person seeking relief, the orders passed by CCI are in rem. Thus, the operative width of the two enactments is different.” (paras 162, 169)
- Reasonable conditions under section 3(5). “whilst an agreement which imposes reasonable condition for protecting Patent Rights is permissible, an anti competitive agreement which imposes unreasonable conditions would not be afforded the safe harbor of Section 3(5) of the Competition Act and would fall foul of Section 3 of the Competition Act. The question as to whether a condition imposed under the agreement is reasonable or not would be a matter which could only be decided by the CCI under the provisions of the Competition Act.” “Thus, in so far as the scope of Section 3 of the Competition Act is concerned, there does not appear to be any overlap or inconsistency with the Patents Act.” (para 172)
- No irreconcilable conflict. “when one views the same in the perspective that patent laws define the contours of certain rights, and the anti-trust laws are essentially to prevent abuse of rights, the prospect of an irreconcilable conflict seems to reduce considerably.” (para 173) “In my view, there is no irreconcilable repugnancy or conflict between the Competition Act and the Patents Act. And, in absence of any irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the jurisdiction of CCI to entertain complaints for abuse of dominance in respect of Patent rights cannot be ousted.” (para 174) “the contention that the jurisdiction of CCI under the Competition Act is ousted in matters relating to patents cannot be accepted.” (paras 173–174, 178)
- The proviso to section 84(6)(iv). “the aforesaid proviso to Section 84(6)(iv) cannot be read to mean that a patentee’s anti-competitive conduct would have to be first established in proceedings under the Competition Act before the Controller could take that into account.” “However, if CCI has finally found a patentee’s conduct to be anti-competitive and its finding has attained finality, the Controller would also proceed on the said basis and on the principle akin to issue estoppel - the patentee would be estopped from contending to the contrary.” (para 177)
- Injunctions sought by an SEP holder. “there is good ground to hold that seeking injunctive reliefs by an SEP” (“Standard Essential Patent”) “holder in certain circumstances may amount to abuse of its dominant position. The rationale for this is that the risk of suffering injunctions would in certain circumstances, clearly exert undue pressure on an implementer and thus, place him in a disadvantageous bargaining position vis-a-vis an SEP holder.” “The position of a proprietor of an SEP cannot be equated with a proprietor of a patent which is not essential to an industry standard.” (para 199)
- Pending infringement suits. “the proceedings under the Competition Act before the CCI are not in the nature of a private lis.” “The proceedings in the suits filed by Ericsson and the proceedings before CCI are not mutually exclusive.” (para 201) “The question whether there is any abuse of dominance is solely within the scope of the Competition Act and a civil court cannot decide whether an enterprise has abused its dominant position and pass orders as are contemplated under Section 27 of the Competition Act.” (paras 201–202)
- A licensee who challenges validity. “In my view, a potential licensee cannot be precluded from challenging the validity of the patents in question.” (para 205) “a potential licensee, could without prejudice to his rights to challenge the validity of patents could take such steps or proceedings which are premised on the patents being valid. The doctrine of election would have no application in this case and it is not necessary for a potential licensee to elect to accept the validity of patents in order to assail its abuse.” (paras 205–206)
- Perversity, and the prima facie view. “This is not a case where it can be held that no reasonable person could have formed a view that the complaints filed by Intex and Micromax, prima facie, disclosed abuse of dominance by Ericsson.” “Therefore, I am unable to accept that the impugned orders passed by CCI are perverse and, therefore, without jurisdiction.” (para 208) “It was thus apposite for the CCI to at least notice the contours of the controversy raised by Ericsson and take a prima facie view.” “Having stated the above, I do not consider it necessary to remand the matter to CCI for reconsidering its prima facie view” (paras 208–209)
- Disposition. “In view of the aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed. All applications also stand disposed of. All interim orders are vacated. However, in the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.” (para 212)
What the court did not decide
On licences for patents, the Court said that “There may be some merit in the contention that a case for abuse of dominant position under clause (a) of Section 4(2) of the Competition Act has not been made out. However, I do not propose to examine that question in these proceedings.” (para 105) On the defence of a refusal to license on reasonable terms in an infringement suit, it was “refraining from dilating on this aspect any further as this aspect would be best debated in the suits filed by Ericsson” (para 160). It added that “nothing stated herein should be construed as an expression of opinion - prima facie or otherwise - on the merits of the allegations made by Micromax and Intex” (para 211).
Subsequent treatment
- Appealed — Set aside by the Division Bench in Monsanto Holdings v Competition Commission of India (2023), which held that “The conclusion drawn by the 2016 Judgement at para. 172, that there is no overlap between the two enactments and that the CCI has powers that the Controller does not have is not sustainable” (para 60) and ordered: “The 2016 judgment and 2020 judgment are set aside.” (para 56)
Provisions and topics
Cited in
Compulsory Licences: The Scheme
Case page · Page updated 10 November 2026
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