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Writ Jurisdiction in Patent Matters

Can a Patent Office order be challenged in a writ petition before a High Court?

Where the High Court is unable to entertain appeals from the Controller through its original jurisdiction, Article 226 leaves it open for an aggrieved party to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the high courts.

Doctrine last updated on 14 November 2026

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Writ Jurisdiction in Patent Matters, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/writ-jurisdiction

1Any order passed by the Patent Office can be a subject matter of further challenge before the courts. As seen in the writ petitions filed by Novartis challenging the order of the Controller of Patent rejecting its patent for Gleevec, the Supreme Court recorded: “At that time, the appellate authority under the Act had yet to become functional. The appellant, therefore, challenged the orders passed by the Assistant Controller in writ petitions filed directly before the Madras High Court.” Novartis v Union of India (2013) (para 15). Thus, it becomes all the more important to strengthen the case at the first instance so that it may stand the challenges that may come its way later. It is to be noted that appeals from an order of the Controller are entertained primarily on points of law. The order of the Controller can be challenged on many legal grounds including the ground that the principles of natural justice were not complied with in giving a reasoned order. Where the High Court is unable to entertain appeals from the Controller through its original jurisdiction, it would be open for an aggrieved party to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the high courts.

2Though patents may involve complex technology and scientific facts, the final finding with regard to its validity will rest with the courts of law. Howsoever complicated the technology may be, in the existing scheme of things, it is the higher judiciary that will sit as a final judge in deciding disputes pertaining to patents. As the decision on a patent will be rendered by the courts of law, it casts a duty on the professionals appearing before the Patent Office, especially in opposition proceedings, to adequately equip the Controller to pass a reasoned order based on the well-establish legal principles governing patent law.

3The restraint that qualifies this jurisdiction was stated in its earliest Indian form in Guest Keen Williams v Controller of Patents and Designs (1984), on a petition against the Deputy Controller’s refusal, in an opposition, to take an opponent’s affidavit off the file and to permit cross-examination. The Calcutta High Court held that “By way of interlocutory application this Court should not interfere and exercise its writ jurisdiction, more so in a case of issuing a writ of certiorari, unless a strong case had been made out, the party should be relegated to adhere to the alternative remedy provided for”, there being “no averment in the petition itself of any instant injury which should call for this Court’s exercise of the jurisdiction under the writ of certiorari” (para 4). Resting on a Division Bench decision it did not name, cited only as “(1935) 39 Cal WN 573 : (ILR 62 Cal 596)”, it recorded the view that “the fact of there being another specific legal remedy, such as a right of appeal, was not conducive to issuing such writs or orders where the want of jurisdiction or refusal or illegality complained of was not based upon the breach of a fundamental principle of justice, where such remedy may not be adequate”, and that “The alternative procedure prescribed may be more speedy or more convenient or less costly” (para 4). Since the Controller’s discretion had been exercised and “the reasons having been given for such refusal on the part of the Controller, this Court should not interfere, sitting over an appeal, with such decision of the Controller”, and since the petition disclosed no “breach of any fundamental principle of justice”, the Court concluded that “this Court should not interfere with the interlocutory order passed by the respondent” (paras 4 and 5).

4In Novartis v Union of India (2007) (paras 1, 8 and 19) the petitions under Article 226 sought a declaration that section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, amended by Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, was unconstitutional. The Constitutional validity of section 3(d) was challenged, not only on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India but also on the ground that it is not in compliance to TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that “Article 64 of ‘TRIPS’ read with World Trade Organisation’s understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the settlement of disputes provides a comprehensive settlement mechanism of any dispute arising under the agreement” and “that this court has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the amended section, being in violation of Article 27 of ‘TRIPS’”. On the challenge under Article 14, the Bench held that “the decision has to depend upon the provisions of the concerned Statute itself” and held that “the amended section is not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

5On declaratory relief under Article 226, the Bench held, “It is a settled position in law that nobody can compel the Parliament to enact a Law” and that “the declaratory relief, even if granted, would be only on paper, on the basis of which, the petitioner cannot claim any further relief in the Indian courts.” The court concluded that “the petitioner in each writ petition is not entitled to even the declaratory relief.” Novartis v Union of India (2007) (para 9). To the same point, in Gunjan Sinha @ Kanishk Sinha v Union of India (2025) the Calcutta High Court met a prayer to declare section 53 ultra vires coupled with “a direction upon the Union of India to suitably amend Section 53 in consonance with Section 11A(7)”, and held that “To legislate or to recommend the Government to legislate in a particular manner or otherwise is not within the domain of a Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India” (para 23), and that such questions “are all issues which are best left to the legislative minds to ponder upon and it is not for the Court to suggest as to how the legislation is to be drafted” (para 26).

6On the powers of the Controller, the Bench observed, “There is no doubt that he is exercising a quasi-judicial function namely, considers the patent claim application in the context of the objections received; hears parties on both sides and then passes an order, either granting the patent or rejecting the patent application, by giving reasons.” The court held, “if the Statutory Authority, in exercising his power, mis-directs himself; abuses his power in an arbitrary manner and passes an order, then, the same could be corrected by the hierarchy of forums provided in the Act itself in addition to the further reliefs available before the Courts of Law.” Novartis v Union of India (2007) (paras 10 and 18). This decision provides a clear distinction between the matters that could be taken up in appeal and the matters that could be raised in writ petition.

7Whether a writ lies against an order made in a pre-grant opposition, when the Act supplies another remedy, was answered by the Madras High Court in Indian Network for People living with HIV/AIDS v Union of India (2008). Met with the contention that the opponent had the remedies of post-grant opposition under section 25(2), revocation under section 64 and review under section 77, the Division Bench held, “This contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that when the very exercise of power by the third respondent under Section 25(1) is not in conformity with the statute and in violation of natural justice, such a decision is ultra vires the said Act and the rules, and can be challenged in a writ petition” (para 54). Its reasons were that “The remedy at the post-grant stage cannot be equated with the remedy at the pre-grant stage”, that “The insufficiency of the opportunity of hearing at the pre-grant stage cannot be made good by grant of opportunity at the post-grant stage”, that “Since, statute has given remedy at both the stages, it must be made available at both the stages. One cannot be a substitute for the other”, and that “An unfair trial cannot be cured by a fair appeal” (para 55). On the eleven months’ delay in moving the Court it added, “It is well known that for invoking writ jurisdiction there is no prescribed time limit” (para 57).

8The Bombay High Court likewise declined to non-suit a pre-grant opponent on that objection in Glochem Industries v Cadila Healthcare (2009), on a petition against an order rejecting a pre-grant opposition. It held that “Although the Petitioners may have remedy of post grant opposition or of seeking suo moto revocation as well as filing of a counter claim as is suggested by the Respondents that by itself can be no basis to non-suit the Petitioners, if the Petitioners were right in their grievance that the authority has committed manifest or jurisdictional error while considering the representation by way of opposition or for that matter decided the objections on palpable misreading and misapplication of the relevant provisions of law”, because “If such a remedy is provided, the authority is obliged to consider the representation by way of pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) keeping in mind the parameters of law by observing principles of natural justice.” The preliminary objection, the Court said, “does not mean that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the decision of the authority on the opposition under Section 25(1) of the Act. It is a matter of prudence and discretion as to whether the Court should entertain the writ petition or not” (para 7).

9In UCB Farchim v Cipla (2010) the Delhi High Court held that “The law is well settled that notwithstanding that a High Court has the power and the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the orders of any statutory authority which is of a quasi-judicial nature, it will decline to exercise such jurisdiction where there is an efficacious alternative statutory remedy available to the aggrieved person” (para 16), and that “this Court should not entertain the writ petition, not because it does not have the power or jurisdiction, but because the petitioner has an efficacious alternative statutory remedy to exhaust.” (para 17) Of a pre-grant opposer who is not a person interested, it held that “the legislature appears to have consciously denied to a third party a further statutory remedy of a post-grant opposition in the event of such third party not succeeding in the pre-grant stage to prevent the grant of patent” (para 20), and that where such an opposition is rejected “it would be for this Court when approached by such third party pre-grant opposer under Article 226 of the Constitution to determine if in the facts and circumstances, the petition requires to be entertained.” (para 21) The Court declined to entertain the writ petition and permitted the petitioner “to file an appeal within a period of two weeks before IPAB accompanied by an application for condonation of delay” (para 38).

10In Neon Laboratories v Troikaa Pharma (2010) the Bombay High Court held that “alleging that the patent was wrongfully obtained and must, therefore, be revoked, is no opportunity contemplated by Section 25(1). That is an opportunity prior to the grant.” (para 44) It held that “As far as our Courts are concerned, the settled view is that if the principles of natural justice are violated, the order is procedurally ultra-vires and therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. Such an error is required to be corrected and is capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”, and that “Therefore, we can safely conclude that in this case the impugned order does not create any right in favour of the Respondent No.1 and the grant of patent, therefore, cannot be said to be valid.” (para 52) It added that “If the grant does not confer any legal right as it is vitiated by non observance of the principles of natural justice, then, to continue the patent as granted, would put a premium on the illegality of the authorities.” (para 54)

11Where the statutory process is still running, the Madras High Court has held the petition premature. In E.R.Squibb & Sons v Union of India (2026), brought against an Opposition Board’s recommendation in a post-grant opposition, it framed the point as “whether the writ petition is maintainable or not?” (para 21) and answered that “what has been challenged is only a recommendation and a final decision is not yet taken by the authorities” (para 27). Because “when there is an opportunity of hearing under Rule 62, the petitioner is entitled to place all the submissions and objections during the hearing” (para 29), the complaint that the Board had not considered the patentee’s evidence “can also be rasied before the controller while a final deicision is made”, and “There is also an appeal provision to challenge the said final order to be passed by the competent authority under Section 117A of the Act” (para 30). “Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed as not maintainable.” (para 31)

12Article 226 has also been used against the Patent Office’s inaction rather than its orders. In Merck Sharp & Dohme v Union of India (2026), where four pre-grant oppositions to an application filed in 2012 were still undecided, the Madras High Court said that “Before issuing directions, this Court has to necessarily take into consideration the inaction on the part of the official respondents which has resulted in the present fiasco” (para 12), and that in the respondents’ counter affidavit “there is absolutely no explanation as to why the authority did not expeditiously take up the pre-grant opposition” (para 15). It directed the Controller “to decide upon 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th pre-grant oppositions filed to the patent application submitted by the petitioner”, “after affording an opportunity to the petitioner” and “within a period of three (3) months thereafter”, and that he “shall strictly comply with the time lines fixed by this Court and pass final orders in the application submitted by the petitioner on its own merits and in accordance with law” (para 16). The Court said nothing of maintainability or of the alternative remedy.

13In ITC v Philip Morris Products (2026) the objection was that an order dismissing interlocutory petitions in a post-grant opposition, “having been passed under Section 25(4) of 1970 Act is an appealable order under Section 117A(2) of 1970 Act assuming the IPs could be filed and hence, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked” (para 52). Referring to its earlier decision in Best Agrolife, the Delhi High Court recorded that “if Petitioner is able to substantiate violation of principles of natural justice and/or failure in exercising jurisdiction and/or non-consideration of vital grounds/documents, Petitioner cannot be non-suited in a writ petition”. The appellant having alleged “violation of principles of natural justice by the Controller while considering the IPs”, and in the light of Whirlpool Corporation, in which the Supreme Court had explained the scope of interference where an alternative remedy exists, “writ petition is held to be maintainable” (para 53).

14Two decisions take Article 226 to an application the law treats as abandoned, on two different grounds. In Deakin University v Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (2026) the Madras High Court framed the point as “whether this is a fit case for this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to restore an application which the law treats as deemed abandoned, to condone the delay in replying to the FER, and to direct the reply to be taken on record” (para 13). The time limits for the reply “are mandatory, and the Controller has no power to extend them”, but “it does not follow that this Court is powerless”, because the Delhi High Court had held “that, in extraordinary cases, a writ court may restore such an application where the applicant never intended to abandon it and the loss was caused by the default of its patent agent” (para 14). A remand “would serve no purpose” since “the Controller has no power to extend the time”, and the Court was “satisfied that this is a fit case for exercise of the writ jurisdiction” (para 17). In Tetra Technologies v Union of India (2026), the Delhi High Court was “conscious of the caution sounded” in The European Union, that courts “exercising writ jurisdiction may, in rare cases, permit the application to be put in order after examining the factual matrix to see as to whether the applicant in fact intended to abandon the patent or not”, but held that “the instant case turns not merely on the condonation of a lapse, but on the absence of effective communication of the FER itself” (para 20), and that “When the service of the FER itself is doubted, the impugned decision would not sustain” (para 21).

Provisions and topics

Provisions
Topics

Cases on this page

Case page

Novartis AG v Union of India (2007)

High Court of Madras·6 August 2007

Case page

Novartis AG v Union of India (2013)

Supreme Court of India·1 April 2013

Case page

UCB Farchim SA v Cipla Ltd (2010)

High Court of Delhi·8 February 2010

Case page

Neon Laboratories v Troikaa Pharma (2010)

High Court of Bombay·26 November 2010

Case page

Guest Keen Williams Ltd v Controller of Patents and Designs (1984)

High Court of Calcutta·26 July 1984

Case page

Glochem Industries Ltd v Cadila Healthcare Ltd (2009)

High Court of Bombay·6 November 2009

Case page

Gunjan Sinha @ Kanishk Sinha v Union of India (2025)

High Court of Calcutta·22 April 2025

Case page

E.R.Squibb & Sons LLC v Union of India (2026)

High Court of Madras·5 January 2026

Case page

ITC Limited v Philip Morris Products S.A. (2026)

High Court of Delhi·10 September 2026

Case page

Deakin University v Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (2026)

High Court of Madras·1 October 2026

See also

Doctrine page

Appeals from the Controller

Can an order of the Patent Controller be appealed to the High Court?

Doctrine page

Powers of the Controller

Does the Controller have the powers of a civil court in any proceeding under the Act?

Doctrine page

Representation by a Patent Agent

Can a company or an unregistered person practise as a patent agent in India?

Doctrine page

Abolition of the IPAB

Does an appeal under the Patents Act lie to the IPAB or to the High Court?

Doctrine page · Written by Prof. Feroz Ali

www.aop.onl/writ-jurisdiction