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Bry-Air Prokon Sagl v Union of India (2022)

High Court of Delhi·Jyoti Singh J·Single Judge·Decided 17 October 2022·2022/DHC/004439

Good law Writ petition allowed and disposed of: the six orders of deemed abandonment quashed and set aside, the six patent applications restored to their original position with four weeks to file responses to the First Examination Reports, and the Petitioners held entitled to file a restoration application for patent IN293448 within four weeks. No further appeal traced as of 28 October 2026.

Though the deadlines for putting an application in order are mandatory, a writ court quashed the deemed abandonments and allowed restoration where only the patent agent was negligent.

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Bry-Air Prokon Sagl v Union of India, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/bry-air

Judgment PDF

Summary

“Present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioners assailing the orders dated 06.08.2018, 13.08.2018, 04.01.2019, 14.10.2019, 05.11.2019, and 18.12.2019, passed by the Controller of Patents and Designs/ Respondent No. 2, whereby Indian Patent Applications filed by the Petitioners were deemed abandoned due to non-filing of timely response to the First Examination Report (‘FER’) as well as against the lapse of Patent No. IN293448 granted to Petitioner No. 3 which has lapsed on account of non-filing of the renewal fees.” (para 1) The Petitioners “had appointed the first Patent Agent to process, prosecute and coordinate six applications and the patent, before the Indian Patent Office” (para 3), and on “confrontation with the first Patent Agent regarding the negligence in prosecuting the applications and patent, first Patent Agent admitted his negligence and also gave an affidavit dated 26.02.2022, to this extent.” (para 8) The petition sought “quashing of the orders of deemed abandonment of the 6 patent applications as well as for restoration of IN293448 granted to Petitioner No. 3 with other consequential reliefs.” (para 8)

The Court held that “A holistic reading of Section 21 of the Act and Rules 24(B) and 138 shows that from the date on which the first statement of objections is issued, a period of six months, extendable by a period of three months, is available to the Applicant to put the application in order” and that “the inevitable conclusion is that the deadlines posited by the Legislature for putting the application in order are mandatory.” (para 16) From the judgments it read, “the position of law that emerges is that Courts while exercising writ jurisdiction have extended the time for filing response to the FER in extraordinary situations, where Patent Agents were found to be negligent in prosecuting the Patent Applications, with no contributory negligence of the Applicant and on showing that the Applicant had a positive intent to prosecute.” (para 19) On the record, “The documents on record do not indicate that the Petitioners were negligent or had any intent to abandon their patent applications” (para 22), and “the present case fits into the exception of ’extraordinary circumstances’.” (para 24) The impugned orders “are quashed and set aside” (para 29), the applications “shall be restored to their original position” (para 30), and “Writ petition is allowed and disposed of, in the aforesaid terms.” (para 31)

What the court decided

  1. The deeming fiction under Section 21. “Section 21(1) of the Act provides that an application for a patent shall be deemed to have been abandoned unless within such period as may be prescribed, the Applicant has complied with all the requirements imposed on him by or under the Act from the date on which the first statement of objections to the application or complete specification or other documents related thereto is forwarded to the Applicant by the Controller.” And: “The corollary to the above procedure and timelines is that if the Applicant does not fulfil the requirements within the prescribed time, the application will be mandatorily deemed to have been abandoned.” (para 14)
  2. Putting the application in order. “Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 24(B) stipulates that time for putting an application in order for grant under Section 21 shall be six months from the date on which the first statement of objections is issued to the Applicant and the time may be further extended for a period of three months under sub-Rule (6) on a request for extension in Form-4 along with prescribed fee, made before the expiry of the period specified under sub-Rule (5).” (para 14) And: “A holistic reading of Section 21 of the Act and Rules 24(B) and 138 shows that from the date on which the first statement of objections is issued, a period of six months, extendable by a period of three months, is available to the Applicant to put the application in order. Therefore, this period is an outer time limit and deadline within which the entire process of objection and reply is required to be completed. Section 21 comes into play the moment the deadline is exceeded and in the absence of compliance by the Applicant by putting the application in order, the application will be treated as abandoned by a deeming fiction of law.” (paras 14, 16)
  3. Rule 138 and the mandatory deadlines. “On 16.05.2016, an amendment was made to Rule 138 of the Rules” and the Court held that “Rule 138 further enforces the rigid timelines envisaged by the Legislature whereby the Controller has discretion of granting extension limited to a period of one month only and therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the deadlines posited by the Legislature for putting the application in order are mandatory.” (paras 15–16)
  4. The position in writ jurisdiction. Reading European Union Represented by the European Commission v. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1793, Ferid Allani v. Union of India and Others, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1756, and the judgments discussed with them, the Court held: “From a reading of the aforementioned judgments, the position of law that emerges is that Courts while exercising writ jurisdiction have extended the time for filing response to the FER” (“First Examination Report”) “in extraordinary situations, where Patent Agents were found to be negligent in prosecuting the Patent Applications, with no contributory negligence of the Applicant and on showing that the Applicant had a positive intent to prosecute.” (paras 11, 19)
  5. Abandonment and intention. “It is equally settled that ‘Abandonment’ requires a conscious act on the part of the applicant, which would manifest the intention to abandon and no presumptions can be drawn in this respect.” (para 19)
  6. Appeal against deemed abandonment. “It also needs no reiteration that deemed abandonment of the application for grant of patent, leads to serious impact on the valuable rights of the patent applicant, which flow in favour of an invention and this is compounded by the fact that under the statutory scheme, no appeal is provided against an order of deemed abandonment of the application for patent under Section 21 of the Act. Therefore, each case would require examination on its own facts and circumstances to see the intent of the applicant to abandon.” (para 19)
  7. The first Patent Agent’s default. “Upon perusal of the above facts and supporting documents, it is clear that the first Patent Agent had not informed the Petitioners of the issuance of the FERs and they were also kept in dark about the status of the applications.” The Court found that “Petitioners are, therefore, right in contending that on account of their long association with the first Patent Agent, they had no reason to doubt him or to suspect that the input given by him, from time to time, was doubtful.” and that “Petitioners have been able to show that as soon as they learnt of his negligence, they engaged a new agent, who took prompt action not only in finding out the current status but also made representations for revival/ restoration. The documents on record do not indicate that the Petitioners were negligent or had any intent to abandon their patent applications.” (para 22)
  8. Errors of the patent agent. “It is a settled position of law that errors/negligence on part of the patent agent without any contributory negligence on the part of the Applicant, has been liberally considered by the Courts, as the consequences of a patent application being abandoned or the lapsing of a patent due to non-deposit of renewal fee are very serious, where the applicant loses his right of claiming exclusivity to an invention.” (para 23)
  9. The caveat of extraordinary circumstances. “A caveat may, however, be added that the Court must exercise the writ jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances.” Recording that in European Union Represented by the European Commission “the Court has rightly cautioned that the intention of the Legislature in Rule 138 of the Rules as well as the mandate in Section 21(1) of the Act cannot be ignored and failure to adhere to the timelines must be visited with serious consequences”, the Court held: “In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that there is no fault or negligence on the part of the Petitioners and therefore, they should not suffer for the fault or negligence of the Patent Agent, and the present case fits into the exception of ’extraordinary circumstances’. Petitioners are thus entitled to file a response to the FERs with respect to the six patent applications so that they can be processed further.” (para 24)
  10. The lapsed patent and restoration. On patent IN293448, “Section 53(2) of the Act provides that a patent shall cease to have effect on expiration of period prescribed for payment of renewal fee, if that fee is not paid within the prescribed period or within such extended period, as may be prescribed. Section 60(1) of the Act comes into play where the patent has ceased to have effect for non-payment of renewal fee within the prescribed period and enables the patentee to seek restoration within 18 months from the date on which the patent ceased to have effect.” The Court found that “Petitioners have been able to demonstrate that the first Patent Agent was negligent in prosecuting the patent applications as well as this patent” and that “Petitioners are, in my view, correct in their contentions that having had a long association with the first Patent Agent since 2012, they had no reason to doubt the statements made by the first Patent Agent that initially, he was following up the matter and later he was taking requisite steps for restoration.” (para 25)
  11. Annuities, extension and limitation. “There is an added reason why this Court is inclined to permit the Petitioners to file for restoration of the patent.” “If the first Patent Agent had been diligent, the annuities would have been deposited by 27.05.2018 or within the extended period expiring on 27.11.2018, on the extension being sought.” and “Since the Petitioners were unaware of the non-prosecution by the first Patent Agent and in depositing the annuities, the benefit of the extended period of 6 months was lost. Insofar as the 18 months period available to an Applicant under Section 60(1) of the Act is concerned, as rightly contended by the Petitioners, a part of this period overlapped with the Pandemic COVID-19 and they are entitled to the benefit of the extension of limitation period by the Supreme Court in ... In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation.” The Court added: “Vide order dated 10.01.2022, the Supreme Court directed that in cases where limitation would have expired between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, limitation shall extend for a period of 90 days from 01.03.2022.” and “it would be a travesty of justice if on technical grounds the Patent is allowed to lapse. Petitioners are thus held entitled to file an application for restoration, in the prescribed Form along with the prescribed fee, within a period of 4 weeks from today.” (para 28)
  12. Disposition. “Accordingly, impugned orders dated 06.08.2018, 13.08.2018, 04.01.2019, 14.10.2019, 05.11.2019 and 18.12.2019, issued by the learned Controller of Patents and Designs, are quashed and set aside.” (para 29) “The patent applications bearing nos. 1446/DEL/2010, 3735/DEL/2011, 178/DEL/2012, 34/DELNP/2013, 81/DEL/2014 and 68/DEL/2015 shall be restored to their original position. Petitioners are permitted to file their response to the FERs, within a period of 4 weeks from today. Upon the response being received, Respondent No. 2 shall take on record the same and the examination by the Patent Office shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules.” and “upon the Petitioners filing restoration application within the time granted by this Court in the prescribed format and the prescribed fee and/or on completion of other necessary formalities, if any, the Patent Office shall consider revival/restoration of the patent in accordance with the Act and Rules.” (para 30) “Writ petition is allowed and disposed of, in the aforesaid terms.” (paras 29–31)

Subsequent treatment

Followed in Bry-Air (Asia) Pvt. Ltd. v Union of India, W.P.(C)-IPD 17/2024, decided by the Delhi High Court (Saurabh Banerjee J) on 26 September 2024, where the reasoning of this judgment was reproduced and applied to restore a patent application whose request for examination had been treated as deemed to be withdrawn under Section 11B(4) of the Patents Act, 1970.

Followed in Deakin University v Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (2026), where the Madras High Court held that “The Delhi High Court in The European Union (supra) and in Bry-Air (supra) has held that, in extraordinary cases, a writ court may restore such an application where the applicant never intended to abandon it and the loss was caused by the default of its patent agent.” (para 14)

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Case page · Page updated 7 November 2026

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