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Dolby International AB v Lava International Limited (2025)

High Court of Delhi·Amit Bansal J·Single Judge·Decided 10 July 2025·2025:DHC:5426; 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 812

Good law Application disposed of: Lava directed to deposit INR 20,08,06,293.92 for sales from 2019 to 2024 within eight weeks, or to furnish an unconditional bank guarantee, and to keep depositing half-yearly; expeditious trial ordered. Lava's appeal, FAO(OS) (COMM) 139/2025, was pending before a Division Bench; no decision traced as of 27 October 2026. Interlocutory

Finding Lava an unwilling licensee and the suit patents prima facie valid, essential and infringed, the Court ordered a pro tem deposit at Dolby's rates from its first assertion.

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Dolby International AB v Lava International Limited, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/dolby-lava

Judgment PDF

Summary

“The present application has been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs” “under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedural Code, 1908 (CPC) seeking interim reliefs. One of the reliefs sought is grant of a pro tem order” “directing a deposit of security by the defendant” (para 1). The suit patents “are stated to be a representative group of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) from Dolby’s Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) portfolio of patents relating to audio coding technology” (para 3). After summons, “the Court recorded that the negotiations between the parties have failed” and “directed Lava to start making deposits of INR 5.13 per device sold, as volunteered by Lava before the Court.” (para 5)

Reviewing the Division Bench judgments, the Court held that “even though the Court is required to give a prima facie finding of essentiality and validity of the suit patents, the level of scrutiny would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.” (para 39) It found that “Lava would be deemed to be an unwilling licensee” (para 49), that “Dolby has made out a prima facie case for validity of the suit patents” (para 69), that Dolby “has established the essentiality of the suit patents” (para 73), and that “a prima facie case of infringement of the suit patents is made out.” (para 81) It rejected the contentions that “the pro tem deposit cannot be ordered for expired patents” (para 95) and that the deposit should run only from the institution of the suit (paras 96–97), and held that “Lava would be liable to make pro tem deposit from 31st December, 2018, when Dolby asserted its SEPs for the first time.” (para 98) “Lava shall deposit a sum of INR 20,08,06,293.92 covering all past sales from the year 2019 till 2024 with the Registrar General of this Court within a period of eight weeks from today.” (para 108)

What the court decided

  1. The principles on pro tem deposits. From the judgments of the Division Benches, “the following legal principles can be culled out” ... “II. Indian courts are empowered to pass a direction for a pro tem deposit, and this power can be exercised under Section 151 of the CPC” (“Civil Procedural Code, 1908”) “, without filing a separate application for the same; III. Pro tem orders are in the nature of ad-interim orders, which operate till the time an application for interim injunction is decided by the Court;” ... “V. Normally speaking, a pro tem order should be directed only after a prima facie finding on essentiality and validity of the suit patents. However, for passing pro tem orders, no detailed exploration of merits of the case is required, as is required for purposes of grant of an interim injunction; VI. The four-fold test laid down by the Single Bench in Nokia v. Oppo (supra) would not apply for purposes of grant of a pro tem order; VII. The Court can form a prima facie view based on surrounding factors.” ... “VIII. Conduct of the parties during negotiations is one of the key factors” ... “An unwilling licensee cannot be permitted to freely sell its devices using the SEPs of the patent owner, without making a pro tem security deposit; IX. There is no requirement for the patent owner to furnish any thirdparty licensing agreements to the implementor at the stage of negotiations or at the stage of determining pro tem deposit.” (para 38)
  2. The level of scrutiny. “In my considered view, the expression, used by the Division Bench in Nokia v. Oppo (supra) in paragraph 81” “has to be reconciled with the observations made in paragraph 58” “Therefore, even though the Court is required to give a prima facie finding of essentiality and validity of the suit patents, the level of scrutiny would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Where the conduct and actions of the implementor during the negotiations stage indicates no serious challenge to the essentiality and validity of the suit patents, the Courts may not get into a detailed exploration of merits. To arrive at a prima facie finding with regard to the essentiality and validity of the suit patents the Court can look at the surrounding factors such as the number of licenses entered into by SEP owners in respect of the portfolio of SEPs relating to the same technology; enforcement of the said SEPs before competent Courts; pro tem orders passed by the courts relation to the said SEPs.” (para 39)
  3. A challenge raised as an afterthought. “If in every case the Court were to conduct an in-depth examination of issues relating to the essentiality and validity of the suit patents, the whole objective behind a pro tem deposit would be defeated.” “In cases where the implementor has not made a credible challenge to the essentiality and validity of the suit patent during the negotiations stage and makes a challenge only during the litigation as an afterthought, the Court can look at the surrounding factors to determine prima facie validity and essentiality of the suit patents. Otherwise, the threshold for deciding a pro tem deposit would become the same as that for deciding an interim injunction application. This is not to say that the Court does not have to examine the aspects of validity and essentiality of the suit patents at all.” (para 40)
  4. Conduct during negotiations. “In light of the above, I am of the view that Dolby complied with the FRAND” (“Fair, Reasonable And Non- Discriminatory”) “protocol by asserting its AAC” (“Advanced Audio Coding”) “portfolio of patents and calling upon Lava to enter into a license agreement with Dolby. However, Lava failed to comply with the obligations of an implementor under the FRAND protocol of showing the willingness to negotiate and execute a FRAND license and to make a counter-offer.” (para 48) “Based on the aforesaid analysis of the correspondence exchanged between the parties, in my prima facie view, the conduct of Lava amounts to ‘patent holdout’. Therefore, in terms of the FRAND protocol, ... Lava would be deemed to be an unwilling licensee.” (paras 48–49)
  5. A counter-offer made only after suit. “The conduct of Lava in making its first counter-offer only after the initiation of the present suit clearly reflects an attempt to delay proceedings and is not reflective of good faith behaviour in FRAND licensing negotiations.” (para 58)
  6. Validity. “Clearly, the attempt of Lava to raise issues of validity at this stage is only to avoid making a pro tem deposit and delay the adjudication of the present suit.” (para 62) “Merely because the new standard is an evolution from the previous standard would not by itself render the patents invalid.” (para 63) “Even though the said orders have primarily been consent orders, at a prima facie stage, they do reflect the essentiality and validity of the suit patents. After all, no licensee/implementor would pay royalty/pro tem deposits in respect of SEPs that are neither essential nor valid.” (para 66) “Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court can take into account the aforementioned factors for forming a prima facie view on the validity of suit patents and need not conduct an in-depth examination on the issue of invalidity of the suit patents raised by Lava for the first time in its counter-claim filed in the present suit.” (paras 62–63, 66, 69)
  7. The counter-offer as an admission. “Even though Dolby has outrightly rejected this offer, the fact that an offer was made by Lava would amount to a prima facie admission with regard to the essentiality and validity of at least some of the suit patents and a prima facie admission of the fact that Lava’s devices implement the suit patents.” (para 67)
  8. Essentiality. “The aforesaid claim charts were furnished by Dolby to Lava during the stage of negotiations. However, the same were not questioned or objected to by Lava in any manner at that stage. Lava has also not filed any counter-claim charts to dispute the claims of essentiality made by Dolby.” (para 71) “Therefore, in my prima facie view, Dolby, on the basis of claim charts filed by it, which remained unrebutted, has established the essentiality of the suit patents.” (paras 71, 73)
  9. Infringement and alternate technology. “Even though the experts of Lava confirm the fact that Lava’s devices implement the standard, it is stated that the said devices do not infringe the suit patents. However, Lava’s experts failed to disclose any alternate technology adopted by Lava to implement the standard. Rule 3(B)(vi) of the Delhi High Court Rules Governing Patent Suits, 2022 clearly mandates that the implementor has to” “disclose the details of the alternate technology adopted by the implementor to implement the standards. The burden to prove the alternate technology cannot be shifted by Lava to Dolby.” (para 80) “Therefore, in terms of the two-step test approved by the Division Bench in Intex v. Ericsson (supra), a prima facie case of infringement of the suit patents is made out.” (paras 80–81)
  10. Exhaustion. “Relying upon the judgment in Strix v. Maharaja (supra) it was held that in order to claim the benefits of defence of exhaustion, a party has to prove that the product in question was obtained in a manner that respects a patent holder’s rights.” (para 82) “In the present case, there is nothing to demonstrate that Lava had any agreement with its suppliers or component manufacturers or sellers of the end-user devices to show that they had a license from Dolby which covered the products imported by Lava.” (paras 82–83)
  11. The implementer’s financial condition. “Therefore, while deciding whether a pro tem deposit is to be made or not, the Court has to consider the financial condition of the defendant.” “The Court has to be conscious of the fact that trials in India take a long time to conclude, and therefore, there has to be a mechanism put in place to ensure that a patent owner is not left with a paper decree, in the event it ultimately succeeds.” (para 85) “From a prima facie consideration of the aforesaid documents, it can be seen that the financial condition of Lava does not inspire confidence and there is genuine apprehension that in the event a decree of damages is passed against Lava, it may not be in a financial condition to pay the same.” (paras 85, 87)
  12. Expired patents. “It was only because of delay being attributable only to Lava that the negotiations were delayed and five of the suit patents expired. Clearly, Lava cannot take advantage of its own” “wrong - on one hand delaying negotiations and on the other hand seeking to take advantage of the fact that suit patents have expired during the course of negotiations.” (para 90) “It has categorically been held by the Division Bench in Intex v. Ericsson (supra) that in respect of SEPs, the license has to be for the entire portfolio and not on a patent-by-patent basis. It necessarily means some of the patents in the entire portfolio would expire, however, new patents would come into being.” (para 92) “Therefore, I do not find any merit in Lava’s contention that the pro tem deposit cannot be ordered for expired patents.” (paras 90, 92, 95)
  13. The date from which deposit runs. “I cannot accept this submission. I have already taken a view in Ericsson v. Lava (supra) that royalty would be payable from the date when the suit patents were asserted by the SEP holder to the implementor.” (para 97) “Therefore, Lava would be liable to make pro tem deposit from 31st December, 2018, when Dolby asserted its SEPs for the first time.” (paras 97–98)
  14. Quantum. “Therefore, the counteroffer made by Lava of INR 5.13 per device sold cannot be accepted.” (para 102) “A perusal of the same shows that the rates offered to Lava are comparable to the rates offered to other similarly placed entities.” (para 103) “Therefore, I proceed to determine the quantum of pro tem deposit on the basis of the aforesaid rates offered by Dolby to Lava.” (paras 102–104)
  15. Disposition. “Lava shall deposit a sum of INR 20,08,06,293.92 covering all past sales from the year 2019 till 2024 with the Registrar General of this Court within a period of eight weeks from today.” “In the alternative, in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench in Oppo v. Interdigital (supra), Lava shall be permitted to submit an unconditional Bank Guarantee from an Indian Bank” “Failure to deposit the abovementioned amount or the Bank Guarantee in the aforesaid terms would entitle Dolby to move an application before the Court for seeking an interim injunction/restraint order against Lava from selling any further devices in India” “Based on the sales made by Lava for the subsequent period beginning from 1st January, 2025, Lava shall continue to deposit amounts in terms of the aforesaid rates or furnish a bank guarantee before the Registrar General of this Court as directed above on a half-yearly basis.” “An expeditious trial is ordered in the present suit.” (para 108)

What the court did not decide

“It is also clarified that the present order does not confer any final finding on infringement or liability, nor does it mandate acceptance of the plaintiffs’ licensing rate as binding. The scope of the pro tem order is limited to ensuring that during the pendency of the suit, the SEP holder is not left without any security, while the implementer retains full opportunity to contest all substantive issues.” (para 109)

Subsequent treatment

Appealed — Lava’s appeal, FAO(OS) (COMM) 139/2025, was before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla JJ) on 6 November 2025; no decision traced as of 27 October 2026.

Followed — in InterDigital Patent Holdings v Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co (2026), where the Court recorded that this judgment “held that the Court is empowered to pass pro tem orders as a temporary arrangement without a detailed examination of the merits of the case” (para 26).

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Case page · Page updated 9 November 2026

www.aop.onl/dolby-lava