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InterDigital Patent Holdings Inc v Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co Ltd (2026)

High Court of Delhi·Tushar Rao Gedela J·Single Judge·Decided 1 July 2026·2026 LLBiz HC (DEL) 672

Good law Applications for pro tem security in both suits disposed of: the defendants directed to deposit, within eight weeks, one-fifth of the cumulative value of their annual counter-offer over the licence period sought, or to furnish an unconditional bank guarantee for that sum. No appeal traced as of 20 October 2026. Interlocutory

Finding the standard essential patents prima facie valid and essential at a lower threshold than for injunctions, the Court ordered pro tem security fixed from the implementer's counter-offer.

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InterDigital Patent Holdings Inc v Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co Ltd, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/interdigital-transsion

Judgment PDF

Summary

“The dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants is regarding use of plaintiff’s Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) with respect to 3G, 4G, 5G ... used by the defendants in their mobile phones. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants have remained unlicensed since launching their smartphones in the Indian market, atleast since April, 2016.” (para 9) The plaintiffs stated that they “have undertaken an obligation to grant licenses for the use of their SEPs to willing, end-user device manufacturers on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory (hereinafter referred to as ‘FRAND’) terms and conditions.” (para 10) Pending the suits, the applications were “filed by the plaintiffs under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” “seeking pro tem security payment.” (para 1)

The Court held that “at the stage of consideration of pro tem security deposit, it is the balance of equities between the parties which is the paramount consideration and thus, only a prima facie understanding of whether the patents are essential and valid are to be considered.” (para 22) It was “of the prima facie view that the plaintiffs have established the validity of the Suit Patents” (para 54), and held that “the plaintiffs have been able to, prima facie, also establish the essentiality of the Suit Patents based on the documents placed on record by the Plaintiffs.” (para 62) It found that “the overwhelming law in this regard is against any mandatory requirement for the plaintiffs to furnish TPLAs” (“third party license agreements”) (para 74), and that “the quantification can be ascertained from the counter offer made by defendant no.1.” (para 84) The defendants were directed to deposit the sum fixed “with the Registrar General of this Court within a period of eight weeks from date” (para 88), and “The applications are disposed of accordingly.” (para 90)

What the court decided

  1. The standard for pro tem security. “It is to be borne in mind that at the stage of consideration of pro tem security deposit, it is the balance of equities between the parties which is the paramount consideration and thus, only a prima facie understanding of whether the patents are essential and valid are to be considered. What such parameters and considerations would be, is entirely dependent upon the facts arising in each case and cannot be applied across the board as a straightjacket formula.” “Thus, the considerations of or directions for deposit of pro tem security cannot be made subject matter of a straightjacket formula.” (para 22)
  2. The lower threshold. “Thus, when SEP” (“Standard Essential Patent”) “holders place on record the claim charts of their patents comprising the SEP portfolio and attempt to map the same with the technical specifications of the manufacturers supported by either an expert’s affidavit or a technical evaluation report, the depth of consideration and evaluation for the purposes of passing orders for deposit of pro tem security may not be at the same threshold at which a Court may be evaluating in order to pass interim injunction orders on the allegations of infringement of suit patents. Therefore, the said evaluation for pro tem deposit would be at a lower threshold.” (para 23)
  3. The implementer’s obligations. Reading the passages it reproduced from Intex Technologies (India) v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) (2023) (para 24), the Court held that “the learned Division Bench unequivocally held that the SEP regime primarily balances the equities between the SEP holders and the implementers, purely to ensure a level playing field.” “In other words, the implementer too has obligations which cannot be wished away or be evaded by reference to non availability of TPLAs” (“third party license agreements”). (paras 24–25)
  4. Validity. “At the risk of repetition, this Court must note that the foreign Court decisions have been alluded to only as aligning aspects to the observations made by this Court. That too, only for the purposes of arriving at a holistic and just decision on the relief of pro tem security deposit.” (para 53) “Ergo, predicated on the above discussion, this Court, at this stage, is of the prima facie view that the plaintiffs have established the validity of the Suit Patents.” (paras 53–54)
  5. Test reports and essentiality. “Though the test reports generated by DEKRA are yet to be tested for their probative value in accordance with law, however, in the opinion of this Court, for the purposes of prima facie finding that the claim charts of the suit patents, forming part of the SEP portfolio, map on to the technical specifications provided by the defendants of their devices, such test reports, constitute sufficient material.” (para 61) “Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have been able to, prima facie, also establish the essentiality of the Suit Patents based on the documents placed on record by the Plaintiffs.” (paras 61–62)
  6. Foreign decisions. “Though, the findings and the conclusions reached by the foreign Courts may not be binding precedents, however, at the stage of considering interim arrangements of deposit of pro tem security, the rationale in such judgments/decisions can be considered and appreciated, provided this Court is satisfied about the existence of other factors.” (para 61) Of the Chinese invalidations: “Though no doubt one foreign Court may have invalided certain suit patents, however, largely, globally different courts of different jurisdiction appear to be in alignment with the finding, even if prima facie, that the counterparts of some of the suit patents are either essential or valid or both.” (paras 61, 75)
  7. Infringement. “So far as the issue of infringement is concerned, this Court is clearly of the opinion that the said issue cannot be considered in a summary manner in which the opinion on validity and essentiality has been prima facie, formed.” (para 63)
  8. Counter-offers and willingness. “From the aforesaid, it can be inferred that the defendant no.1 has shown its willingness to obtain license of the SEP portfolio, of course on FRAND” (“fair, reasonable and non discriminatory”) “terms” “Even if this Court were to take note of the argument that these are not admissions and are offers without prejudice to their rights, at this stage, having regard to the correspondences exchanged, may be a relevant consideration for the purposes of balancing equities and passing orders for a reasonable pro tem deposit to secure the interest of the plaintiffs.” (para 67)
  9. The defendants’ financial condition. “Be that as it may, in the considered opinion of this Court while a precarious financial condition of the defendants may be a factor propelling the Court to pass orders for deposit of pro tem security, however, if the ultimate considerations for the deposit of pro tem security is to balance equities and ensure security to the plaintiffs, the financial condition may be one of the factors only and not the only factor.” (para 69)
  10. Balance of equities. “Moreover, during the period of negotiations, defendant no.1 has not secured the financial interests of the plaintiffs despite showing willingness. Thus, the need to balance equities. It cannot be fathomed that a party can continue to sell its products; continue negotiations; continue technical evaluation of the claims; not provide any security to the SEP holder; not disclose the alternate technology that might be used in its products; not demonstrate how the technologies are being used without infringing the standards and SEP portfolio, and still insist that there is no requirement for the Court to pass orders for deposit of pro tem security.” (para 70)
  11. Pro tem security and injunction. Adopting Nokia Technologies v Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications (Delhi, 3 July 2023), the Court held “that granting pro tem security does not confer any advantage to the licensor/SEP holder, rather, it only balances the asymmetric advantage that an implementor has over a SEP holder.” (para 76)
  12. Third party licence agreements. “The defendant no.1 being in the commercial sphere surely cannot feign ignorance of how to assess or ascertain the figures relevant to it, while negotiating FRAND terms. Thus, this Court is unable to appreciate the contention of the defendants that no orders for pro tem security deposit can be made unless the plaintiffs furnishes TPLAs and is made accessible either to the Court or the defendant no.1. The said submission is unmerited.” (para 71) “Thus, the overwhelming law in this regard is against any mandatory requirement for the plaintiffs to furnish TPLAs, particularly at the stage of consideration of pro tem deposit.” (paras 71, 74)
  13. The power to direct production. “It is possible that in certain cases the Court may, if it is of the opinion that such documents are required, direct the parties to produce TPLAs. The opinion rendered by the learned Division Bench ought not to be construed as if it forecloses the power of the Court to direct a party to furnish TPLAs if it is of the opinion that to determine the payment of pro tem security, such material would be a factor which needs to be considered before any such direction is passed.” (para 74)
  14. Indian patents and the portfolio. Of the argument on “section 48 of the patents Act, 1970” (para 80), the Court held: “in view of the peculiar manner in which the 3G, 4G and 5G technologies work, the assessment and quantification of pro tem security cannot be compartmentalised and insulated from other patents forming part of the SEP portfolio.” “Moreover, the parties, in their correspondence have nowhere negotiated prices or rates etc on patent to patent basis, or a country specific patent manner, but the entire portfolio.” (paras 80–81)
  15. Non-disclosure of alternate technology. “A perusal of the written statement indicates that the defendants had not furnished any details with regard to any alternate technology that might have been used in the products, which appears to be in contravention of Rule 2(f) of the High Court of Delhi Rules Governing Patent Suits 2022.” (para 85)
  16. Quantification. “It is clear from the aforesaid that the gap between both the offers and counter offers is very wide and thus, there cannot be a mid way between the two. In the absence of any TPLA, it is difficult to quantify the pro tem security. In such circumstances, it would be in alignment with the aforesaid observations and analysis that the quantification can be ascertained from the counter offer made by defendant no.1.” (para 84) “As such, it appears to this Court it would be fair and in the interests of justice to direct the defendants to deposit 1/5th of” the cumulative total, and “The deposit so directed has to be calculated in INR as per the exchange rate prevailing as on date.” (paras 84, 87)
  17. Disposition. “The defendants shall deposit a sum of” the amount fixed “or the equivalent in Indian Rupees with the Registrar General of this Court within a period of eight weeks from date. The said sum shall be kept in an interest bearing FDR in the name of the Registrar General, with auto renewal mode.” “In the alternate, the defendants would be at liberty to submit an unconditional bank guarantee” (para 88) “The applications are disposed of accordingly.” (paras 88, 90)

What the court did not decide

“It is made clear that this Court has not given any definitive conclusion one way or the other as to the correctness or probative value of the test reports.” (para 61) “It is made clear that the observations and analysis made hereinabove shall not tantamount to any final expression on merits.” (para 89)

Subsequent treatment

No later judicial treatment and no further appeal traced as of 20 October 2026.

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Cases this judgment relies on

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Case page · Page updated 22 November 2026

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