Indian Network for People living with HIV/AIDS v Union of India (2008)
High Court of Madras·A.K. Ganguly CJ & F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla J·Division Bench·Decided 2 December 2008·AIR 2009 (NOC) 839 (Mad); 2009 (3) ABR (NOC) 503 (Mad)
A requested pre-grant hearing is mandatory, and a patent granted without it is a nullity: Patent No.207232 set aside and the opposition remitted to a different officer.
Indian Network for People living with HIV/AIDS v Union of India, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/inp-plus
Summary
“Both the petitioners in this writ petition are registered societies under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and they are providing support to people living with HIV/AIDS” (para 1). The fourth respondent, a company “registered in Switzerland”, “filed a Patent Application” “for a patent relating to Valganciclovir” (para 2), and its “Patent Application No.959/MAS/1995 was filed on 27.07.1995, and the 2nd respondent published the said application on 25.02.2005” (para 2). “Thereafter, on 12.07.2006 the petitioners filed a representation by way of opposition at a pre-grant stage to the Patent Application of the 4th respondent under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, 1970” (para 3), and in it “they gave grounds of opposition and specifically demanded hearing under Rule 55(1) of the Patents Rules, 2003” (para 4). “The petitioners were not informed of anything about the fate of their objection, nor were they informed of the date of hearing in respect of their objection, though they made a specific request for such a hearing.” (para 6) “Thereafter, the Patent Office granted the patent to the 4th respondent and the same was published in the Official Journal of the Patent Office on 29.06.2007.” (para 7) The writ petition sought “a writ in the nature of Certiorarified Mandamus” to “quash Patent No.207232” (para 10).
The Court held that “the pre-grant opposition proceedings come within the sweep of any proceedings under Section 77 of the said Act” (para 23), that the Controller is “thus having the trappings of a Civil Court” (para 24) and “functions as a quasi-judicial tribunal and has to decide the lis” (para 28), and that “the Court cannot read the word shall hear as may hear in the context of the statutory provision falling for consideration in this case” (para 40). On prejudice it held that “the prejudice here is on a different level and not on a personal level” (para 44) and that “In cases where there was total failure in affording the opportunity obligated upon, the resultant order would be a nullity” (para 61), so that “the decision to grant patent is a nullity and not an irregularity which is to be cured” (para 61). “For the reasons discussed above, we allow the writ petition. The grant of patent in Patent No.207232 by the office of the respondents 2 and 3 in Patent Application No.959/MAS/1995 filed by the fourth respondent is set aside.” (para 68)
What the court decided
- The question on the writ petition. “In other words, the precise question is whether by denying the petitioners their statutory right of hearing under Section 25(1)(k) of the said Act read with Rule 55(6) of the said Rules, which are also statutory in nature, the Controller can purport to reject the petitioners objections to the grant of patent at a pre-grant stage and a patent, which has been granted in violation of the aforesaid statutory provisions is valid in the eye of law.” (para 11)
- Pre-grant opposition and Section 77. “Section 77 of the said Act makes it clear that subject to any rules made, the Controller in any proceedings before him under the Act shall have the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of certain matters.” (para 21) The Court rejected the argument that Section 77 applies only after grant: “Rule 55(6) of the said Rules, which is confined only to a pre-grant stage clearly characterize the pre-grant exercise by the Controller as proceedings” and “Thus, the pre-grant opposition proceedings come within the sweep of any proceedings under Section 77 of the said Act.” (paras 22–23)
- The trappings of a civil court. “The Controller, before whom the proceedings takes place, is endowed with some of the powers of a Civil Court, and whose order or costs are executable as a decree of a Civil Court, is thus having the trappings of a Civil Court. Proceeding before such an authority are obviously a quasi-judicial proceedings. In a pre-grant stage, the Controller is also deciding a controversy, which is raised by the objector opposing the grant of patent and the applicant who applies for the grant.” (para 24)
- The lis at the pre-grant stage. “So he has to decide this controversy between the applicant s right to get the patent and the objector s right to defeat the claim of patent. The objector may not be a rival in trade of the person claiming the patent. But the objector can raise his objection on much wider grounds of public policy and public interest.” (para 25) “Following the aforesaid test, as we must, this Court holds that the third respondent functions as a quasi-judicial tribunal and has to decide the lis namely, the right of the objector raised on a wider perspective as against the claim of patent by the fourth respondent.” (paras 25, 28)
- Any person and locus standi. “This is an illustration of statutorily broadening the concept of locus standi and widening the scope of objection procedure by giving access to any person” ... “who has a concern for public interest in the area of public health and nutrition, to raise an objection. The grant of patent is virtually a grant of monopoly right against the whole world and that is why such wide ranging right of objection has been designedly given at a pre-grant stage.” (para 32)
- “Shall hear” is mandatory. “Therefore, it is clear that the expression may give the opponent an opportunity to be heard has been replaced by the word shall hear . Where legislature itself makes such alteration, making its intention clear in specific term, no option is left except to follow the strict letter of law.” (para 35) “In the instant case, there is no ambiguity in the words used in Section 25(1)(k) about the mandatory duty cast on the Controller to hear the objector. The said duty, which is cast in Section 25(1)(k) is also reiterated in Rule 55(6) of the said Rules” (para 37) “Therefore, the Court cannot read the word shall hear as may hear in the context of the statutory provision falling for consideration in this case.” (paras 35, 37, 40)
- Where “shall” may be read down. Of State of Haryana and Another Vs. Raghubir Dayal reported in (1995) 1 SCC 133, where “the word shall is used both in Section 4(1) and Section 6(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, but it must be read as directory”, the Court held: “In the instant case, by the word shall the legislature has conferred a right of hearing on the objector and by granting him a right of hearing no inconvenience is caused to any innocent person or general public. On the other hand while denying him the right of hearing, the general public interest in the matter of raising objections is defeated. Therefore, the considerations which weighed with the learned Judges in the case of Raghubir Dayal are not present here.” (para 41)
- Prejudice in the public interest. “A right is a legally protected interest. Therefore when law consciously confers right on a person to object at a pre-grant stage that right must be protected in the way it has been granted, namely the right to object with a right of hearing.” (para 33) “Here the right of the objector is not an individual right as it is in the case of an employee” ... “So, the prejudice here is on a different level and not on a personal level.” ... “The concept of prejudice is not a static concept” (paras 33, 44)
- Total denial of hearing. “Therefore, we can safely draw the line as between cases where it was obligatory on the part of the authority to afford a fair opportunity which he fails to offer and cases where there are certain defects in affording such opportunity, in which case the extent of fairness may have to be tested vis-a-vis the extent of prejudice caused. In cases where there was total failure in affording the opportunity obligated upon, the resultant order would be a nullity.” “So following the ratio in State Bank of Patiala we hold that the decision to grant patent is a nullity and not an irregularity which is to be cured.” (para 61)
- The statutory manner. “There is another age old principle which enjoins when statutes provides for dong something in a certain manner, it has to be done in that manner alone, all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.” “Following the said principle in the instant case it is clear that the grant of patent to the fourth respondent has been made in blatant violation of statutory procedure by the statutory authority, which is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Such a grant is not legally sustainable.” (para 51)
- Consideration under Rule 55(6). “In view of those principles the third respondent is required to act with a greater application in view of the specific stipulations for consideration contained in Rule 55(6), read along with Section 25(1)(k) of the Act. So by denying a personal hearing to the petitioner before deciding the petitioner s objection, the third respondent acted wholly without jurisdiction in its order of grant of patent in favour of the fourth respondent. The grant of patent is thus as non est in law and consequently is liable to be set aside.” (para 60)
- The post-grant remedy is no substitute. “This contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that when the very exercise of power by the third respondent under Section 25(1) is not in conformity with the statute and in violation of natural justice, such a decision is ultra vires the said Act and the rules, and can be challenged in a writ petition” (para 54) “The remedy at the post-grant stage cannot be equated with the remedy at the pre-grant stage. The insufficiency of the opportunity of hearing at the pre-grant stage cannot be made good by grant of opportunity at the post-grant stage. Since, statute has given remedy at both the stages, it must be made available at both the stages. One cannot be a substitute for the other. An unfair trial cannot be cured by a fair appeal.” (paras 54–55)
- Laches. “It is well known that for invoking writ jurisdiction there is no prescribed time limit. There can be only laches or inaction of the petitioners which are organizations of HIV affected people who are battling for life against the dreaded disease. They can take a reasonable time to organize themselves to fight a litigation against a multinational company. Judged in this context, a period of eleven months is not fatal to bar relief to the petitioners whose fundamental right under Article 14 namely, protection under the law i.e., a statutory right of hearing has been denied. Their fundamental right to life under Article 21 is also affected inasmuch as their access to treatment become illusory in view of grant of patent to the fourth respondent, which escalates the costs of medicine beyond their reach.” (para 57)
- Equity cannot override law. “When patent illegality is writ large on the grant of patent, equity cannot prevail over law.” “Equity can only supplement the law, it cannot supplant or override it” (para 65)
- The relief and the officer. “The grant of patent in Patent No.207232 by the office of the respondents 2 and 3 in Patent Application No.959/MAS/1995 filed by the fourth respondent is set aside. The third respondent must hear only the petitioners and the fourth respondent on the petitioner s representation at the stage of pre-grant opposition filed under Section 25(1) of the Act. The third respondent need not consider any other pre-grant objection pursuant to this judgment. Such hearing should be completed by 31st January, 2009.” (para 68) Because “The affidavit shows a rather biased attitude of the deponent who granted the patent to the fourth respondent”, the Court directed “the second respondent to assign the consideration of the petitioner s pre-grant opposition to any other officer in the rank of Assistant Controller of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks in the Intellectual Property Office, other than the officer who granted the Patent and published it on 29.06.2007” (paras 68–69)
Subsequent treatment
Followed — In Neon Laboratories v Troikaa Pharma (2010) the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reproduced this judgment at length and held that “the interpretation placed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court, in the context of identical submissions and on the same statutory provisions, cannot be brushed-aside as suggested by Mr.Kadam.” (para 39)
Provisions and topics
Cited in
Pre-grant Opposition
The Nature of Pre-grant Opposition
Writ Jurisdiction in Patent Matters
Case page · Page updated 19 November 2026
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